My partner was scrolling through her social media about a week ago, when she stumbled upon a Gettier Problem. In particular, the post she found referred to a specific case by Edmund Gettier, where an individual’s claim to knowledge is challenged, regarding who will get a job and who has ten coins in his pocket. The poster claimed to have solved the problem. Unfortunately, I cannot find this post, so I cannot look at their solution. If someone comes across this, I would be interested to know what sort of solution they decided upon.

For some background, epistemology is the study of knowledge. That is, epistemologists are concerned with what knowledge is and how we can be sure we have it. Essentially, when can we say that we know that we know something. If this brief introduction is already getting confusing, then you are still with me here.

The issue is of this idea of “knowing.” What is it “to know” something? And how can we be sure that we have it right? If someone else makes a knowledge claim, how can we verify their claim? And assuming we can, what does the claim tell us? It is an incredibly messy topic, and I don’t expect to resolve it here and now. I just hope to enlighten a little.

The first important concern to raise is the issue of certainty. That is, if I claim to know something, does this mean I am entirely certain, or just mostly certain? It seems unlikely I could ever make a claim with complete certainty; for one, I could always make a mistake. If I look into a field and see a sheep, and then make a claim that there is a sheep in the field, what if the sheep happens to be a dog disguised as a sheep? I may not have realized this, and so no amount of certainty will help me here. I could be completely certain but still entirely wrong. This clearly would not count as a knowledge claim. This is where the requirement for “truth” in knowledge claims comes in. Whatever I claim as knowledge must be true, in some sense.

The idea of truth itself has many problems, so I will work with a definition like the following: for something to be true, it has to match up perfectly with the world, at least the world as I know it. One will notice the subtle problem that has already infiltrated my claim: I already have to know something in order to make a knowledge claim. After all, I need to know something about the world in order to claim knowledge about something in the world.

It seems that a claim to knowledge is already falling into circular reasoning. To know, I must already know. I believe there is a simple solution to this dilemma: assumption. That is, if I assume the world is as I believe it to be, then I can claim knowledge about that world. Instead of starting with knowledge, I start with an assumption. Or, to put this a bit differently, my initial assumption has to be a knowledge claim.

Where I am going with all this is that all knowledge must necessarily begin with assumptions. I have to make an assumption before I can begin making claims of knowledge. For example, I have to assume that my senses are giving me accurate information regarding the world, and that that sheep I see in the field is in fact a sheep. If the sheep is not a sheep, then I do not know that a sheep is in the field. In fact, if my senses are not providing for me accurate information, then I cannot make a knowledge claim about the world either.

This leads me, inexorably, to a major problem regarding knowledge. As seems to be a growing concern among many people, what if we are all simply in a simulation? If the field itself is simulated, and does not actually exist, then I can certainly make no claim about a sheep being in a field that does not exist. Any attempt to make a claim will have to be challenged, as I can have no knowledge regarding no field.

However, if an assumption can count as knowledge, then I can start to make claims of knowledge. If I assume that this world I occupy is in fact real, and not a simulation, then I can begin to make claims to knowledge about this world. My assumption at the outset is a knowledge claim. This does sound counter intuitive.

To perhaps put this another way, I can instead suggest that every claim of knowledge includes underlying assumptions. Perhaps instead of claiming that assumptions can count as knowledge, I should instead suggest that all knowledge claims come pre-packaged with assumptions. Those assumptions are the grounding required in order to sustain the claim of knowledge. For example, I said there is a sheep in the field, but what I implied is that the field exists and is real, and that the object I see in the field is a sheep. This may now start to sound pedantic, because clearly my reference to a field obviously implies the existence of the field. This is entirely my point.

I, unfortunately, do not speak any other languages than English. So what I’m about to say may not hold true with some other languages. In English, there are many tricks of the language that bring in assumptions in subtle and sometimes insidious ways. For example, when I say “I see a sheep in the field,” my statement implies the existence of myself, my ability to see, a sheep, and a field. Also, I imply that there is a relationship of “in” that exists, whereby an object can exist within another object, in some sense. I do not say any of these assumptions, but my listener will understand these things. It is a trick of the language.

It is worth noting here that René Descartes‘s claim of certain knowledge of the self utilizes this trick. That is, to say “I think” automatically implies the statement “I exist,” which can be stated by saying “I am.” Therefore, to say “I think, I am” is simply to make a statement and make clear one of my underlying assumptions for the statement. It is, in fact, NOT a claim of certain knowledge, but instead an insidious way of suggesting that my underlying assumption counts as knowledge.

I think this is all needed. I do not believe there is any certain ground for me to utilize. Any attempt for me to find a certain ground fails, as Immanuel Kant pointed out in his Critique of Pure Reason. I necessarily must make an assumption in order to get the ball rolling. I would also argue that these underlying assumptions exist at all times, and that our language is preloaded with them. That is, when I say anything, there are many underlying assumptions that will be understood by my listener in all circumstances.

I will not dispute another if they insist that an assumption cannot possibly count as a knowledge claim. However, if they insist this is the case, I would simply point out that there can then be no claims of knowledge. After all, every possible claim to knowledge will fall flat without the support of an initial assumption about something.